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Social capital is a resource, a propensity for mutually beneficial collective action that 
communities possess to different extents.  Communities with high levels of social capital are able 
to act together collectively for achieving diverse common objectives.   
While the concept of social capital is valid universally, the measure of social capital will 
vary by context.  It must be related in each case to aspects of social relations that assist mutually 
beneficial collective action within that particular cultural context. 
A locally relevant scale of social capital was developed to assess whether and how social 
capital mattered for development performance in 69 north Indian villages.  Variables 
corresponding to other bodies of explanation, including extent of commercialization, relative 
stratification, and relative need were also examined, but a combination of high social capital and 
capable agency was found to associate most closely with high development performance.   
Agency is important particularly in situations where institutions are not available that 
enable citizens to connect with the state and with markets.  The productivity of social capital is 
considerably reduced on account of this institutional gap in the middle.  Development 
performance can be improved in these situations by adding to the stock of social capital and also 
through enhancing agency capacity. 
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Social capital has become prominent within the vocabulary of development practitioners, 
but there is little consensus about what it is, how it is observed and measured, what outcomes it 
supports ￿ and more important, what outcomes it does not support.  In popular imagination, and 
also in some scholarly writings, social capital is often equated with all that is good about human 
and social relations.  And it emerges from these renditions as no more concrete than a warm, 
fuzzy feeling, lacking concrete empirical referents that one can examine to study this variable 
independent of its effects.  Consequently, people ￿ particularly busy practical people ￿ tend to be 
somewhat cynical when references are made to the power of social capital.   
I have worked for 15 years as a development practitioner, and I tend to be skeptical as 
well about newfangled ideas and fashionable terminology.  But I do see considerable hope in the 
idea of social capital.  And I should like to use this opportunity to clarify this concept and to 
associate it in our minds with images of reality that we see around us in our everyday work.  
By helping focus attention on talents and energies that exist at the grassroots ￿ within 
indigenous communities and local groups and not so much among national planners and 
international consultants ￿ concern with social capital helps rectify a severe imbalance in 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor of Political Science, Duke University.  
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development practice.  It frees up space for communities to plan their own futures, and it forces 
national planners to recognize that communities are not all alike.   
Development practitioners have for long been aware that program results vary 
considerably from one location to another.  Even very standardized programs have quite non-
standard results.  But it has been hard so far to account for these differences.  Why should 
Community A derive higher benefits from some program than Community B?  When both 
communities received the same level of assistance overall, why should results vary so much from 
one location to another?  A number of different reasons ￿ quality of leadership, effectiveness of 
program staffs, etc. ￿ can be suggested to explain these observed differences.  And social capital 
is one other possible explanation that must be considered within this mix. 
Social capital refers to the quality of human relations within some well-defined social 
group that enables members of this group to act in cooperation with one another for achieving 
mutual benefits.  More formally, it is defined as ￿features of social organization such as 
networks, norms and social trust that facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit￿ 
(Putnam 1995: 67).
2   
We are all aware of communities that are more cooperative, where members care for one 
another and where they are prepared to act collectively for common purposes.  And we are all 
aware of other groups in which there is more infighting, discord, jealousy, and selfishness.  The 
concept of social capital formalizes these everyday observations; more than that it makes the 
claim that these inter-group differences have important consequences for the results that these 
groups can achieve in practice.   
                                                 
2 Notice in passing (we will come back to this aspect later) that networks and network density constitute just one 
among multiple aspects that can potentially constitute social capital.  Some analysts have, however, equated social 
capital with network density, thereby severely confining the scope of this concept.  
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More cooperative groups will achieve better development and governance outcomes, it is 
claimed, while groups with lower levels of social capital will have lower achievements in the 
social, political and economic realms.  What happens within the group influences its 
achievements in the world outside. 
This is a claim worth taking seriously.  It adds an important new element to development 
practice, and it asserts that this element can make the crucial difference between success and 
failure. 
Plans and programs are central for development, it was believed earlier, and better plans 
and programs were sought in order to achieve better results.  However, performance continued to 
be mixed even as programs of assistance were refined and improved.  Some communities 
performed very well and other communities performed very poorly, and the reasons for success 
and failure were never completely well understood. 
It is important though to understand these reasons better.  Such knowledge can help 
ratchet up the pace of development.  For if one knows what causes success and what causes 
failure, and if one can influence the levels of these factors, then significant improvements can be 
made in people￿s quality of life.  Such a claim inheres in the concept of social capital, and it is 
worth our while to suspend cynicism and to examine seriously whether societies￿ fates can be 
improved significantly through paying attention to social capital. 
Section 2 of this paper presents the methodology of the study that provided the in-depth 
insights as well as quantitative data for assessing the effect of social capital.  What constitutes a 
high level of social capital will be discussed in Section 3, where I will discuss issues related to 
the measurement of social capital.  Social capital is a quality that exists inside people￿s heads; it 
can never be observed and measured directly.  A number of proxy measures have been  
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constructed that are each relevant for scaling this concept in a particular cultural and social 
setting, and different sets of proxies are more suitable for this purpose in different societal 
contexts. 
In Section 4 of this paper, I will present some results obtained from comparing 
development outcomes in 69 north Indian village communities.  Social capital matters 
significantly for development outcomes, it is seen here.  Villages that have high levels of social 
capital also have significantly higher development performance.  However, the utility of social 
capital is enhanced considerably when this resource is utilized strategically.  The capability of a 
particular set of village agents is of special importance in this respect.  Villagers who are 
knowledgeable and well versed in dealing with government agencies and market operations help 
target villagers￿ social capital toward incentives available in the external environment.  Agency 
capacity matters in addition to high social capital, it is seen.
3  Villages that are not well led in this 
respect achieve much lower development success even when they have high levels of social 
capital. 
Section 5 presents an agenda for action to help capture the potential of social capital 
while avoiding some pitfalls that can result from glorifying this concept.  Social capital may or 
may not be possible to enhance over the short term, it is argued, but the utility of a given stock of 
social capital can be enhanced significantly through strengthening intermediary institutions.  
When the channels that connect communities with state and markets are widened and unblocked, 
social capital can flow without hindrance into improving development results.  In situations 
where these channels are constricted or unavailable, social capital remains a latent resource, 
potentially useful but not immediately usable. 
                                                 
3 Agency is understood here in terms of the definition provided by Sen (1999: 18-19) of agent as ￿someone who acts 
and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether 





2.  STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
Over two years starting in the summer of 1998, I lived among village communities in the 
Indian states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.  I selected Rajasthan because I have lived and 
worked there for 15 years as a government official.  I understand the local dialects, and I know 
different plans and programs that have been implemented in this area.   
I did not present myself as a government official when I went to the villages this time, 
however.  I selected parts of the state where I had not worked before, and I traveled by myself or 
with one or two companions, using public transportation and living in public buildings that 
villagers made available to me.   
For the first six months, I spent my time observing patterns of collective action in these 
villages.  What activities did villagers undertake collectively, and what activities did they usually 
undertake individually?  It was in the former sets of activities ￿ those that most villagers thought 
appropriate to execute in association with their fellows ￿ that I would find my culturally 
appropriate referents of social capital (as discussed in Section 3). 
I studied 16 villages as case studies, staying in each of them over considerable periods of 
time and speaking with a wide cross-section of villagers.  Later, I extended the inquiry to 69 
villages.  I was supported for this extended survey by a group of 16 field investigators, equally 
men and women, who are themselves villagers from this region, and who speak and dress like 
the people they interviewed.  Together, the investigators and I interviewed a sample of over 
2,000 villagers, selected by random sampling from all adult villagers of these 69 villages.
4 
                                                 




The average population of these villages is about 1,100 persons, divided into about 200 
households, and average area of a village is a little under 2,000 acres, almost half of which 
consists of wasteland and scrub forest.  More than 90 percent of village residents have 
agriculture as their principal occupation.  However, average landholding is small, about half of 
one acre per capita, and land quality is mostly quite poor.  The area is mostly all semi-arid, and 
drought is a frequent visitor, with rainfall being well below average in two years out of every 
five.  Nearly 45 percent of village residents are poor, i.e., their incomes are less than the 
officially-calculated poverty line.    
I came to know the conditions behind these statistics as I lived in these villages, and I 
inquired into the nature of results for which the villagers cared most deeply.   They were 
concerned, first and foremost, with development performance.  Not all development results 
matter equally, to be sure, but there are some specific development outcomes that they care for 
much more than any other outcome in the economic, social or political realms.   
 
3.  MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
We already cited that social capital is defined as ￿features of social organization such as 
networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit￿ 
Putnam (1995: 67).  Putnam (1993) ranks social capital in Italian regions according to a measure 
of density of membership in formal organizations.  It must be noted, however, that this is a proxy 
measure of social capital: it is not directly concerned with norms or with trust but it looks, 
instead, at certain manifestations that accompany social capital in this specific setting.  It is not 
obvious that similar manifestations of social capital will be observed within other cultures.  
Diverse forms of human activity develop to deal with different needs and compulsions of life in  
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different ecological and cultural settings.  Networks, roles, rules, procedures, precedents, norms, 
values, attitudes and beliefs are different among people who have different patterns of life.  
Measures of social capital that are relevant for one set of cultures can be irrelevant for others. 
Density of formal organizations is a particularly inappropriate indicator for Rajasthan 
villages.  Villagers in Rajasthan have set up hardly any formal organizations voluntarily, and 
nearly every formal organization in these villages has been set up at the initiative of some 
government agency.  Villagers join these organizations mostly in order to gain some immediate 
economic benefits; no traces of collective action are associated usually with such government-
sponsored organizations in India and elsewhere.  Mostly richer and better connected residents 
have also attended government-sponsored organizations in other parts of the Third World and 
mostly also with the limited objective of deriving economic benefits cheaply.  ￿Government 
officials and employees of the project agency got first claim to these resources, along with some 
relatively better-off villagers￿ [Most] villagers perceived these schemes as not for ordinary 
farmers.  They came to these projects mostly with a cynical attitude, hoping to gain access to 
subsidized credit or to some other cheaply available resources.￿ (Zoetelief 1999). 
Formal organizations in these developing country contexts do not, therefore, provide any 
reliable indication of voluntarism and cooperation among villagers.  However, several informal 
networks exist and many villagers attend these networks regularly.   
A locally relevant scale for measuring social capital in Rajasthan was devised that relies 
upon assessing participation in informal networks.  It considers those types of activities with 
which people of this area are commonly engaged.  Not all activities are valid for investigating 
cooperation and coordination within any particular context.  Social capital exists ￿in the relations 
among persons￿ (Coleman 1988: S100-101), and only those activities should be considered for  
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measuring social capital that members of a particular culture regard appropriate to carry out 
collectively rather than individually.   
Six such activities were considered for the purpose of measuring social capital in the 
context of rural Rajasthan. 
1.  Membership In Labor-Sharing Groups: Are you a member of a labor group in the village, 
i.e., do you work often with the same group very often, sharing the work that is done 
either on your own fields, on some public work, or for some private employer?  
Responses were coded as 0 for ￿no￿ and 1 for ￿yes.￿  These responses were aggregated 
for all individuals interviewed in each surveyed village, thereby measuring the proportion 
of villagers who do participate in such networks.  More than 80 percent of respondents 
gave a "yes￿ response to this question, though this proportion varied from a high of 98.5 
percent to a low of 73 percent among different villages. 
2.  Dealing with Crop Disease:  If a crop disease were to affect the entire standing crop of 
this village, then who do you think would come forward to deal with this situation?  
Responses ranged from ￿Every one would deal with the problem individually,￿ scored 1, 
to ￿The entire village would act together,￿ scored 5.  Individuals￿ responses were 
averaged for each surveyed village. 
3.  Dealing with Natural Disasters: Suppose there was some calamity in this village 
requiring immediate help from government, e.g., a flood or fire, who in this village do 
you think would approach government for help?  Responses varied from ￿No one,￿ 
scored 1, to ￿The entire village collectively,￿ scored 5.  
4.  Trust:  Suppose a friend of yours in this village faced the following alternatives: which 
one would he or she prefer? 
•  To own and farm 10 units of land entirely by themselves  (scored 1) 
•  To own and farm 25 units of land jointly with one other person in this village (scored 
2). 
 
The second alternative would give each person access to more land (12.5 units, instead of 
just 10 units represented by the first option), but they would have to work and share produce 
interdependently.  The more people trusted other people in their village, the more they tend to 
prefer this second option.  The question was framed so that the respondent was not making an 
assessment of his or her own level of trust, but rather of how trusting other people in the village 




5.  Solidarity: Is it possible to conceive of a village leader who puts aside his own welfare 
and that of his family to concern himself mainly with the welfare of village society?  
Responses ranged from ￿Such a thing is not possible,￿ scored 1, to ￿Such a thing happens 
quite frequently in this village,￿ scored 3.   
6.  Reciprocity:  Suppose some children of the village tend to stray from the correct path, for 
example, they are disrespectful to elders, they disobey their parents, are mischievous, etc.  
Who in this village feels it right to correct other people￿s children?   Four alternatives 
were posed: ￿No one,￿ scored 1; ￿Only close relatives￿ scored 2; ￿Relatives and 
neighbors,￿ scored 3; and ￿Anyone from the village,￿ scored 4.  Averaged individual 
responses ranged from a high of 3.45 to a low of 1.70. 
 
Responses to these six items were highly correlated with one another and they all loaded 
highly on a single common factor, indicating that villages that have high scores on any one 
manifestation of social capital also tend to have high scores on the other five manifestations 
observed here.  Village scores on the six separate items were aggregated to form the Social 
Capital Index.  This Social Capital Index is highly correlated with each of its six constituent 
items, as reported earlier.  It is correlated also with other indicators of local norms and informal 
networks.
5  There is hardly any correlation, however, between the Social Capital Index and any 
of the other structural and agency variables considered below. 
Let me conclude this discussion of measurement by re-emphasizing that social capital is 
not directly observable; people carry it inside their heads.  What one can observe and measure 
are some manifestations or behavioral consequences given rise by social capital, including both 
structural and also cognitive elements (Uphoff 2000).  Different cultures uphold different 
expressions of social capital, hence its observable aspects will vary contextually.  Different 
                                                 
5 Responses to other survey questions concerning mutual support networks and expectations of collective action are 
highly correlated with the Social Capital Index (SCI), for instance, ￿If some epidemic were to occur among cattle or 
humans in this village, what do you think the people of this village would do?  Will they act unitedly?￿ (Correlation 
with SCI = 0.592); and ￿Suppose some person from this village had to go away for a while, along with their family.  
In whose charge would this person leave their fields?  Can only close relatives be trusted, or a larger group of 




measures of social capital are appropriate thus for different social and cultural contexts.  The 
measures that were developed and used for Rajasthan may be applicable after adaptation in other 
developing country contexts.  But this claim needs to be verified through careful field inquiries.  
Developing a locally appropriate index of social capital is the first step to take before examining 
the utility of social capital and investigating how one can add to its stock.  And to do so 
effectively, one must be familiar with the specific societal contexts that one is considering.  
 
4.  ASSESSING THE UTILITY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
EXAMINING DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES 
Development means different things to different people.  For people living in these 
villages, four sets of outcomes are most important for defining benefits related to development 
performance.  Livelihood stability is first among these important development outcomes, 
followed by employment generation, poverty reduction, and quality of basic services.  These four 
development outcomes outrank by far any other outcomes that most villagers value in the 
economic realm.  And it is hardly surprising why this should be so. 
Living in a semi-arid region, where rainfall is scarce and highly variable ￿ where most 
people depend on agriculture for a livelihood but most have relatively tiny plots ￿ villagers in 
Rajasthan are very concerned about having food, fodder, and firewood available on a continuous 
basis.  While food crops (mostly millets and maize and some wheat) are grown on privately 
owned land, fodder and fuelwood are collected mostly from common lands, which comprise 
between a third and a half of total village area in most cases.  Protecting, preserving and 
developing these common lands is a collective concern of villagers, and their performance in a 
program of common land development provided one indicator for examining the relative impact 
of social capital.  
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Employment generation provided a second indicator for comparing the utility of social 
capital relative to other bodies of social explanation.  Nearly half of all village households, 45 
percent to be exact, depend for their subsistence on getting wage employment for at least one 
month each year.  Such employment is obtained most usually from some government-sponsored 
construction work located near their village.  This work is usually of a casual nature, engaging 
laborers from day to day, and it is in the interest of villagers to have these works located as close 
to home as possible.  People of different villages vie with each other to have such employment 
generating works located in their particular village, and the extent of success in this collective 
endeavor ￿ measured in terms of days of public works employment per capita averaged over the 
last five years ￿ provided a second outcome indicator for examining the development impact that 
social capital can have in this region. 
Poverty reduction benefits provided a third indicator.  Nearly the same proportion of 
households who look for wage employment in order to make ends meet, 45 percent, have 
incomes that are below the officially recognized poverty line in this region.  Government 
programs exist that provide assistance to such below-poverty-line households, but some villages 
have been successful in attracting more poverty grants per capita, and this pattern has repeated 
itself over multiple years.  Poverty grants per capita averaged over the preceding five years 
constitutes the third indicator for assessing social capital as a predictor of economic development 
outcomes. 
The fourth and final development indicator that I considered relates to quality of basic 
services.  Villagers are concerned to have better education and health facilities and clean 
drinking water.  An index composed of their subjective assessments of service quality in these 




HIGH- AND LOW-PERFORMING VILLAGES 
These four development indicators are related to quite different aspects of development 
performance, respectively, livelihood stability, employment generation, poverty reduction 
benefits, and service quality.  But they are nevertheless found on examination to be quite closely 
interrelated with one another.  In general, villages that perform relatively well on any one of 
these four activities also perform comparatively better than other villages in each of the other 
three activities.   
Village scores in these four different activities are quite closely correlated with another, 
and they align commonly on a single underlying factor, as seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1--Development performance: Factor pattern 
Variable Name  Score 
Livelihood Stability   0.82 
Poverty Assistance  0.69 
Employment Generation  0.84 
Quality of Basic Services  0.71 
Adapted from Krishna (2002) 
 
 
High performing villages do well in general across multiple and different programs, and 
low performing villages do poorly overall.   
The nature of the program does not matter so much for development success or failure, 
these data show.  Rather, there is some peculiar quality of villages that makes some of them 
perform well, by and large, and other perform poorly ￿ no matter which development program is 
taken up for comparison.  
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In order to assess what this hidden quality might be ￿ whether it is social capital or 
something else ￿ I constructed a single scale of development performance.  By combining 
together village scores on these four different activities,
6 a single Index of Development 
Performance was constructed, and scores were calculated on this index for each of these 69 
villages.   
It would be better if economic development performance could be compared using some 
more commonly used statistic, such as GDP.  But such statistics are not available for this level of 
disaggregation.  No other village-level statistics are generated that can be used reliably to 
undertake comparisons of this kind.  And one needs to construct one￿s comparative measures 
anew. 
I selected these specific measures because they correspond to what villagers themselves 
value in these particular contexts.  Two of these measures ￿ employment generation and poverty 
reduction ￿ reflect villagers￿ ability to obtain higher development benefits from the government.  
The other two measures are somewhat different.  Livelihood stability reflects how well villagers 
have been able to preserve assets created through investments made jointly by villagers and the 
government.
7  Outcomes related to protecting, preserving and developing these common lands 
were measured seven years after government funding had come to an end.  Protection and 
preservation were paid for entirely by villagers in the intervening period.  Villagers that did 
better on this outcome measure were those that could better undertake these investments by 
themselves. 
                                                 
6 Since they are so closely correlated with one another and since they align commonly on a single common factor, as 
seen from Table 1, it is valid to combine them within a single index of development performance. 
7 Villagers contributed 20 percent of the direct costs of these schemes and they also contributed considerable 
amounts of their time.  
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Quality of basic services, the fourth indicator, also reflects villagers￿ collective inputs.  
While the basic services are themselves provided by the state government, the quality of these 
services ￿ and villagers￿ satisfaction levels ￿ vary substantially from village to village.  Extent of 
provision by government is related closely to population norms.  However, service quality can be 
improved both when villagers collectively confront government officials and also when they 
collectively assist in improving service delivery.   
Interestingly, village performance on any one of these four separate indicators is related 
closely to performance on each of the other three indicators.  What factors can help explain these 
differences between high-performing and low-performing villages? 
 
ASSESSING THE UTILITY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND OTHER EXPLANATIONS  
Different bodies of theory were consulted to identify alternative explanations for the 
observed variations in village development performance scores.  Several independent variables 
were considered for this purpose.  These variables are discussed briefly below. 
According to some observers, differences in caste, ethnicity and wealth might limit 
villagers￿ potential for acting collectively for common development benefits.  The following 
variables were constructed to assess the impact of stratification and heterogeneity on 
development performance scores.  The variable N_CASTES measures the number of different 
caste groups that reside in any village.  This variable provides one measure of the extent of 
homogeneity within the population of a village, and it assesses the extent to which caste 
differences affect villagers￿ potential for collective action.  The variable CASTE_DOM measures 
the proportion of village households that belong to the most numerous caste group.   
Relative modernization might also make a difference to village performance (Inkeles and 
Smith 1974).  Since the impulse of modernization and commercialization is likely to be less well  
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felt within villages that are located farther from markets, the variable, DISTMKT, was utilized 
that measures the distance in kilometers to the nearest market town.  The relative level of 
infrastructure facilities might also help to explain differences in development performance 
(Gaiha 1989).  The variable INFRASTR combines scores for level of facility related to 
transportation, communications, electrification, and water supply.   
Literacy matters for development performance according to some other observers, for 
instance, Dreze and Sen (1995), who propose that economic development in communities is 
expected to be closely related to educational achievement.  LITERACY was calculated as the 
sample percentage of persons having five or more years of formal education. 
Though all villages in the sample face shortages of fodder and fuelwood, some among 
them are more acutely affected by scarcity than others.  An explanation of collective action based 
on a rational-actor premise would predict that communities whose members have a greater sense 
of deprivation and more acutely experienced common need will be more likely to act collectively 
for this purpose (e.g., Wade 1994).  This relative needs hypothesis was tested with the help of 
two sets of three independent variables: DRYLAND assessed the ratio of rainfed (unirrigated) 
cropped area to irrigated cropped area, and PERCPOOR measured the percentage of village 
households that are poor in relation to the official poverty line.   
A corollary to the above hypothesis stresses the relative need of powerholders.  
According to Knight (1992), collective action is most likely to arise on occasions when the 
powerholders in a society are most in need of the rewards likely to result from such action.  The 
relevance of this hypothesis was tested by looking at the distribution of animal ownership by 
households.    
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The importance of government staff support was also separately assessed, particularly in 
relation to results in the livelihood stability program.  Differences in the motivation and 
competence levels of government staff assigned to work with different villages, and in the extent 
to which they participated in the community￿s activities, were assessed through asking 
respondents about how frequently staffs of the concerned department visited their village and 
also by assessing the percentage of villagers who would recognize by sight the local staff of the 
concerned department. 
In addition to these variables that are concerned with structural differences among 
villages, a number of agency variables were also considered for this analysis.  The following 
agency forms are commonly functioning in these villages, and they are each regarded by some 
body of theory as having a significant (positive or negative) impact upon village development 
outcomes.
8 
•  Traditional patrons, with str_PCR derived from scores on survey responses to nine 
questions on patron-client relations 
•  Leaders of different caste groups in a village, with str_CASTE derived from scores on 
survey questions related to strength of caste leadership 
•  Traditional village councils, with str_VC based on survey questions on strength of 
councils in the villages 
•  Officially local government (panchayats), with str_PANCH derived from survey 
questions on the strength of these elected bodies in the villages 
•  Political parties, with str_PARTY derived from survey questions about the activities of 
parties in the village 
                                                 
8 For detail on the definitions of each of these variables and underlying theoretical literature, see Krishna 2002.  
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New village leaders (village youth with some education who have come up within the 
past twenty years and who help other villagers establish contacts with state agencies and market 
operations),
9 with str_NEW based on scores on the existence, utility, and contact by villagers 
with such new leaders.   
These types of agency are common among villages in this region.  However, the 
effectiveness, utility and range of functions of each type of agency differ from village to village, 
and I looked to these variations for developing scales for comparing agency strength.   
RESULTS 
All of these variables, corresponding to different bodies of explanation were considered ￿ 
along with social capital ￿ for understanding why some villages consistently outperform other 
villages in terms of development performance scores.  Regression analysis as well as case study 
examination showed that only three among these independent variables were significant for 
explaining differences in Development Performance scores.   
Results from regression analysis are shown in Table 2.   
                                                 
9 A longtime observer of village politics described these new leaders to me in the following terms:  ￿They are 
usually between twenty-five and forty years of age￿[and] educated to about middle school [level].  They read 
newspapers, have low-level contacts in numerous government offices, and are experienced [in dealing] with the 
government bureaucracy and with banks, insurance companies, and such like￿ Their caste does not matter.  These 
new leaders can be of any caste, but they must have knowledge, perseverance and ability.￿  Separately and with the 
help of the field investigators, I interviewed nearly 120 such new leaders, and I found that they had come up and 
gained influence mostly within the past two decades.  The spread of primary education in rural areas and also 
expanded interface with state and market agencies had contributed to the rise of these new leaders in villages.  For a 
more detailed discussion of cause and effects related to the emergence of these new village leaders, see Krishna 
(2002, 2003).  
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Table 2--OLS Regressions on development performance: 
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(D) Interaction    
(SCI*Str_NEW)     0.08*** 
(0.009) 
N 60  60  60 
R
2 0.12  0.28  0.43 
Adj-R
2 0.04  0.21  0.37 
F-ratio 1.56  3.39  6.27 
F-probability 0.186  0.01  0.0001 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *p<=.05 **p<=.01 ***p<=.001 





The only significant variables are social capital, literacy, and the capacity of the new set 
of young village leaders, who have emerged and gained strength over the last two decades.  None 
of the other variables ￿ not commercialization or modernization, or relative need, or stratification 
and heterogeneity ￿ were at all significant for explaining these results.
10 
Social capital is significant by itself, but it makes an even greater impact on development 
performance when the value of the agency variable is also high.  These two variables ￿ social 
capital and capacity of new village leaders ￿ have a multiplicative impact upon each other in 
influencing development performance.  High social capital is good for development 
performance, but this positive impact is made considerably larger when agency capacity is also 
high.  And the impact of social capital is quite low (often close to zero) when agency capacity is 
very low or non-existent.  Let me illustrate this point with the help of two village examples.   
Balesariya Village 
People trust each other considerably in this village, and they meet often and cooperate 
about numerous community issues and common problems.  Balesaria consequently has a high 
score on the Social Capital Index.  But it does not score highly on the Index of Development 
Performance.  Why does their high social capital not translate into superior results vis-￿-vis 
economic development?   
Low agency capacity prevents people of Balesariya village from converting their stock of 
social capital into a flow of economic benefits.  To be able to gain economically, residents of any 
village must be able to make connections with the outside world.  They must know what 
programs are available with state agencies and what opportunities exist in the market.  They must 
                                                 
10 Some independent variables are correlated with each other, for instance, STR_CASTE is correlated with 
CASTEDOM, and Literacy is correlated with PERCPOOR, but pair-wise correlation among the independent 
variables is no greater than 0.5 in any case.  The value of the Condition Index is 24.68 for model 1, indicating 
moderate collinearity, and it is less than 15 for Models 2 and 3, indicating low collinearity.    
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have available to them the services of effective agents who can forge these connections on their 
behalf.   
Mangilal, sarpanch (chief) of Balesariya￿s panchayat (village government), is the only 
one among the 1,011 residents of this village who has any regular contact with any state or 
market agency.  However, Mangilal is not a very efficient agent.  He cannot easily cheat the 
villagers ￿ villagers are strongly united, and social sanctions, including ostracism, are imposed 
swiftly and firmly, with no scope for appeal ￿ and Mangilal serves as well as he can.  But 
Mangilal￿s abilities are quite severely limited.  He has not invested much in gaining information 
about new programs and opportunities, and he is not very persuasive with government officials 
and market operators.   
Despite their ample stocks of social capital thus, residents of Balesariya have fallen quite 
far behind other villages in terms of economic development performance.  These failures of 
achievement are quite evident when one visits this village.  The approach road to the village is a 
muddy path, impassable during the three monsoon months.  Drinking water is still taken from the 
community well, and there is no piped water supply anywhere in this village.   
Villagers here make good use of the resources that they have, and they have allocated 
these resources reasonably effectively and equitably.  Without the support of capable new 
leaders, however, they have been unable to add significantly to their resource base. 
Ghodach Village  
There are seven new leaders in this village of 2,003 inhabitants, and each of them is 
capable and effective in his ways.  However, social capital is quite low in this village, and 
villagers are unable to act collectively to achieve any common objectives. 
Development is slow in Ghodach because ￿villagers are not able to agree and form a 
consensus among themselves.  That everyone gets together behind some work and behind  
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protecting and maintaining [the assets that are created by] this work ￿ such a thing never happens 
in this village.￿
11  Even though their leaders have the ability to connect effectively with 
marketplace opportunities and with program agencies of the state, their efforts often come to 
naught because villagers do not act collectively in support of these initiatives. 
No rules guide the use of common land in Ghodach, and pastures planted under the 
watershed development program have been mostly destroyed.  Half of their schoolteachers had 
been missing for a long period during the time I stayed in this village, but the villagers had not 
collected to present a petition to the government department concerned.  The approach road to 
the village was in severe disrepair, but no village meeting was convened to discuss and act upon 
this situation. 
They have capable new leaders but the residents of Ghodach are unable to achieve any 
coordination among themselves. Villagers here are suspicious of each other, and they have little 
faith in initiatives that are taken by anyone else in the village.   
Their low stock of social capital prevents villagers in Ghodach from deriving any sturdy 
flows of development benefits, despite the presence of capable agency.  In Balesariya, on the 
other hand, the stock of social capital is high, but capable agency is absent, so benefits are small.  
Social capital is a resource that needs to be marshaled carefully by agents who can bring 
it to bear effectively and reliably upon incentives available in the external environment of state 
and market.  Where such agents are available, social capital helps produce very beneficial 
development outcomes.  But villages that do not have such effective agents available are unable 
to convert their stocks of social capital into a flow of development benefits. 
                                                 
11 Interview with Sarup Singh, previously Sarpanch of Ghodach village, June 18, 1998.  
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Several practical consequences emerge from this finding, and I will return to this 
discussion in the concluding section.   
 
5. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Social capital and agency both matter for development results, we saw in Section 2, and 
they matter in conjunction with one another.  High agency capacity multiplies the beneficial 
effects of social capital; and when agency capacity is low large stocks of social capital may be 
relatively worthless in terms of development results. 
Why should agency matter in this way?  A large part of the answer to this question has to 
do with the weakness of middle-level institutions in developing countries.  Communities, 
especially rural communities, are only very poorly connected to the state and to markets.  Such 
communities are not able to engage profitably with state and market agencies, so even very large 
stocks of social capital are not easily translated into high development benefits. 
High social capital communities are better equipped to act collectively for mutual benefit.  
But what ensures that such collective action will be successful in terms of its goals?  In terms of 
democracy and development, especially, where the state is the target of collective action by 
communities ￿ i.e., where the result is not entirely or even mainly within citizens￿ control ￿ it is 
hardly certain that collective action will not end up being a wasted effort.  To succeed in 
achieving their goals, citizens must also at a minimum be well informed about the processes of 
decision-making in the state, and they must be able to gain access to the officials who make and 
implement these decisions.  
Adequate information and easy access are implicitly assumed within the social capital 
hypothesis, but information and access are not always at hand.  They are relatively easily 
available to citizens of some countries, and they are extremely hard to obtain by citizens of  
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others.  Agency matters in the rural Indian contexts studied here because information about state 
institutions and government programs is not easily available to most villagers.  Low literacy and 
poor-quality physical infrastructure contribute to this gap, but villagers￿ ability to obtain high-
quality information is limited as well because of the weakness of middle-level institutions, those 
that stand between the grassroots and the national levels.  Parties are weakly organized in the 
Indian countryside, and local governments serve merely as implementing agencies of a 
centralized state.  Neither parties nor local governments help villagers make effective 
connections with state agencies.   
To gain access to the offices of the state and to avail themselves of the benefits of 
government programs, villagers must take recourse to agents who are available locally.  Without 
the support of capable agents who help make fruitful connections for villagers, it is not clear to 
what ends they should target their collective efforts and what strategies they should adopt.   
Weaknesses in middle-level institutions produce large gaps in information and access, 
and these gaps make it difficult for citizens to take full advantage of the opportunities for self-
development that are made available by state organizations and market operations (Ostrom 1996; 
Tendler 1998).  Agency becomes important in these situations. 
Middle-level institutions are weak not only in rural India, but also in other developing 
countries and countries undergoing transition from socialism, so agency should matter in a fairly 
large number of cases.  Evidence from different developing and transitional countries attests to 
this view. 
RUSSIA  
Informal (grassroots) and formal (state) institutions often contradict each other￿ Russia 
today continues to suffer from a missing middle of organizations linking informal grassroots 
networks and modern organizations￿.this gap is sometimes filled by anti-modern enterprises 




CENTRAL AMERICA (5 countries) 
There are few ￿local and accessible links between townspeople and government.￿  Locally-
evolved ￿community development organizations act as local-level town governments and see 
themselves as responsible for making national and local governments more responsive to the 
townspeople (Seligson 1999). 
 
UGANDA 
Village residents in Uganda find it hard to connect with agencies of the state.  What they 
know and what is available to them ￿ their traditional laws and deliberative bodies ￿ are not 
valuable for these purposes; and what is valuable ￿ state programs and state assistance ￿ is 
usually hard to access￿ Decentralization has not helped￿to reduce this distance (Opio-
Odongo and Lwanda-Ntale 2000). 
 
UKRAINE 
There was no one who could help the recently formed association of concerned parents for 
meeting with government officials and for influencing government policy with respect to the 
handicapped.  Political parties rarely take up citizens￿ issues, and officials pay little heed to 
groups that have no official status and no mass following (Sheremeta, et al. 2000). 
 
BOLIVIA 
Bolivia￿s agrarian reform of the 1950s created an institutional vacuum in the rural areas￿it 
annulled the old feudal patterns￿but little was done by the state or its agencies to build 
linkages with peasant organizations (Demeure and Guardia 1997: 91). 
 
ZAMBIA 
Urban-based political elites, who are more educated and more knowledgeable about the 
functioning of the state machinery, act as agents for their rural-based ethnic communities.  
￿Political mobilization of communities by such agents lends weight to their demands for 
preferment in the distribution of public goods￿ (Bates 1999). 
 
National-level institutions and community-level social capital can both be made more 
productive in these contexts through policies that help construct effective middle-level 
institutions and build strong bridges over the existing institutional gap in the middle.  Where the 
formal institutions of the state have been crafted from above, and where these institutions mesh 
poorly with informal and traditional institutions at the grassroots of society, a fairly significant  
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gap often appears in the middle.  Indigenous agency types develop in response to this gap 
between the demand and the supply of intermediation services. 
The new village leaders, of whom more than a hundred were interviewed for this study, 
have acquired considerable utility in this regard.  Because villagers frequently consult with them 
in respect of diverse dealings with state and market agencies, and because they are 
knowledgeable and capable for driving effective bargains with government officials and party 
politicians, the new leaders increasingly represent the voice of substantial numbers of villagers.  
Assistance that is provided at times of great need ￿ taking a sick person to the district hospital in 
the middle of the night, helping another escape lightly from the clutches of a rapacious 
policeman, finding old-age pension support for someone else, etc. ￿ creates a fund of personal 
obligations that new leaders can bank upon.  Especially when such assistance is provided 
willingly and without regard for immediate personal gain, it helps elevate the new leader to high 
status in his village.
12  
Some new village leaders seek to profit economically from the work that they do on 
behalf of individual villagers.  But more than half of the new leaders I met are motivated to 
achieve high status and political position, and short-term economic considerations matter 
relatively little in their calculation of personal profit.  Respect and status are accorded more 
highly to leaders who do not seek to become rich at the expense of their fellows.  Such leaders 




                                                 
12 Most new village leaders are men, though there is a small proportion who are women. 
13 Roughly half of the new leaders I met have acquired part-time government positions that provide them with 
steady if low incomes.     
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Alternative avenues for connecting with state and markets have become available in this 
manner.  People in villages use these connections to make more efficient use of their stocks of 
social capital.  An important collective resource ￿ that might have remained dormant on account 
of missing middle-level institutions ￿ has been mobilized and made productive through the 
intervention of these village agents. 
Social capital may or may not be easy to build up over the short term.  The evidence in 
this regard is mixed and so far inconclusive.  Putnam et al. (1993) propose that social capital is 
accumulated only very slowly.  ￿History determines,￿ they claimed, and ￿historical turning 
points￿have extremely long-lived consequences￿ (1993: 179).  Analyses undertaken in other 
parts of the world indicate, however, that social capital may not be a historically fixed 
endowment and that it might be possible to build up stocks of social capital within relatively 
short spans of time (e.g., Hall 1997, and Schneider et al. 1997).  The issue is far from resolved.   
While analysis remains to be done regarding the causes of social capital, experience 
shows that agency strength can grow rapidly even within relatively short periods of time.  
Building middle-level institutions is important.  But institutional forms do not need to be 
imported from elsewhere, and imported institutions can quite often fail to live up to their 
expected performance (Firmin-Sellers 2001; Sch￿nw￿lder 1997).  Development results can be 
improved considerably even within the existing system, especially if one is willing to work 
alongside the forces that have developed indigenously and of their own accord.  New institutions 
at the middle level are more likely to succeed if they are folded in with what villagers already 
have and what they can hold accountable in terms of local knowledge and everyday 
understandings of right and wrong.  Different agency types have developed indigenously, and it 
is worth examining whether these can be strengthened and helped to acquire value and stability.   
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The productivity of existing social capital can be considerably enhanced by following this 
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